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What do Kurds want? As the conflict has continued to persist for more than 
three decades, both the Turkish state and Kurdish political movements claim 
to represent the interests of Kurds, particularly cultural and political demands 
of Kurds in Turkey. Despite the long life of this conflict, and the claims 
of political actors from both sides, we still do not know how the interests 
and demands of ordinary Kurds align with specific political actors or, more 
importantly, with the Turkish government. The competing claims to represent 
ordinary Kurds cause the major actors in the conflict, whether prostate or 
pro-Kurdish, to reinforce their positions and intensify the conflict, resulting 
in greater suffering for the very people they claim to speak.
However, these claims of representation are not empirically verified, and 
the risk of self-serving bias and distortion is obviously great. The major politi-
cal parties, including the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi, AKP), People’s Democratic Party (Halkın Demokratik Partisi, HDP), 
or Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), all claim 
to understand Kurds’ needs and be most responsive to and representative of 
their cultural and political preferences. Unfortunately, neither scholarship nor 
the media provide much empirical evidence for Kurds’ demands. Does the 
AKP government’s offer of optional Kurdish language courses in schools—
the most they have managed to secure yet—satisfy Kurds? Or do Kurds have 
further demands, both political and cultural? What about their views toward 
the PKK or legal Kurdish parties? Do all Kurds agree with the government’s 
description of the PKK as a “terrorist” organization, and how many see it as 
a resistance organization fighting for independence?
This chapter investigates these questions by analyzing nationally repre-
sentative public opinion survey in Turkey. This survey captures cultural and 
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political demands of Kurds in 2011 and in 2015, respectively, before and 
after peace negotiations begun between the AKP government and the Kurdish 
political movement. First, we trace the trajectory of the state policies toward 
the Kurdish conflict, followed by an examination of proposals, by both the 
state and Kurdish movements, to “solve” the problem. Then we use an origi-
nal public opinion data to test the extent to which ordinary Kurds share the 
views of the main political actors. These surveys conducted before and after 
the peace talks will help us to capture the change in attitudes between these 
two different political contexts regarding the Kurdish conflict. While present-
ing what the Kurdish street wants, we will limit the number of issues to the 
perception of interethnic equality in the cultural and political sphere as well 
as attitudes toward Kurdish parties such as the HDP and the PKK.
Our analysis suggests that while Turkish governments have relatively 
recently implemented reforms to expand Kurdish rights, these have remained 
limited, and still does not recognize Kurdish identity as a collective cul-
tural and political identity. However, the Kurdish ethnic identity has grown 
increasingly important to many Kurds as a result of the politicization of their 
identity during the three-decades-long civil war.1 Our findings confirm this 
assessment: The majority of Kurds want education in their mother tongue, 
to listen to sermons in Kurdish, to restore villages and town to their Kurdish 
names, and want to be served in Kurdish in hospitals, courts, and other public 
institutions. As to their political demands, half of the Kurds polled demanded 
a regional parliament and flag, the establishment of Kurdish as an official 
language, and political autonomy. Political developments between 2011 and 
2015, including the peace talks, the Roboski Massacre on December 28, 
2011, the siege of Kobani in October 2014, and the AKP’s indifferent reac-
tions to these events have further complicated an already fraught situation. 
They have served both to increase support for cultural and political autonomy 
and secession, and to empower Kurdish parties that have gained the reputa-
tion as the true representatives of the Kurdish street a few months before the 
peace process officially ended in the aftermath of the June 7, 2015 elections.
FRAMING KURDS AND KURDISH CONFLICT
To understand and analyze public opinion on salient social, economic, and 
political issues, we need to investigate how elites across the political spec-
trum construct a political discourse and function as society’s gatekeepers, 
using media and educational institutions as intermediary agents. Political 
behavior literature suggests that ordinary people turn to the elites for their 
cues in forming their opinions on political issues, whether these elites are 
party leaders, labor unions, the Church, or others.2 In other words, one’s 
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ideological stance, as well as ethnic and religious identity, affects which elites 
they will turn to and process information or cues while the elites compete 
to shape public opinion to their own purposes. In this regard, the Kurdish 
conflict in Turkey is typical rather than exceptional and illustrates how social 
and political elites shape public opinion on the Kurdish conflict, and to what 
extent the Kurdish street is receptive or resistant to the competing discourses 
and policies of elites, particularly Kemalist elites.
The next section discusses how the state and mainstream political parties 
approach and frame the Kurdish problem, with a particular focus on the post-
1984 era. It investigates their discourses and policies the Turkish mainstream 
media dutifully propagated. Then, it turns to the Kurdish political movement 
that offers an alternative discourse, pointing to political and economic dis-
crimination of Kurds, and demanding political and economic equality.
FROM BROKEN PROMISES TO DENIAL
Even though there are different phases of the Kurdish conflict, the state’s 
responses to the Kurdish problem between 1923 and the early 1990s can be 
identified as the denial of the Kurds and Kurdish “problem.” It is true that 
the Kurdish problem did not start with the formation of the nation-state, but 
goes back to the centralization policies under the Ottoman Empire; however, 
for the sake of space, this article will focus on the post-1923 era.3 The denial 
policies in this era have dominated the political discourses of both Turkish 
actors and institutions. The causes of this denial lie, to a certain extent, in 
the (inherent) colonial/hierarchical mindset of Turkish elites, derived from 
the institutionalized belief that to catch up to the civilized world, a modern 
nation-state must be created around a secular Sunni Turkish identity. The 
ruling elites of the new republic, mostly former generals or bureaucrats 
originally from the Western provinces of the Ottoman Empire, had shared 
the belief that adopting political reforms for (religious) minorities or giving 
political autonomy to them in the nineteenth century had not stopped the 
disintegration of the empire. Disturbed by this experience, despite the found-
ing elites of the republic promised and even played with the idea of local 
autonomy for Kurds during the independence war, the Turkish political elites 
discounted any political reform that would have granted cultural or political 
autonomy to Kurds. Rather, they formulated policies that viewed Kurdish 
ethnicity as an existential threat to be either assimilated or repressed.4
To assimilate a Kurdish population largely residing in the southern part 
of the country into the new Turkish national identity in the early 1920s, the 
state banned the Kurdish language in public spaces and replaced street, vil-
lage, and town names with Turkish ones.5 Parents could not give Kurdish 
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names to their newborn children, and in the eastern and southeastern region 
of Anatolia, Kurdish schools (mostly religious schools called medrese) were 
closed.6 Turks received preferential treatment in hiring at public institutions 
in Kurdish-dominated cities, and many Kurdish-speaking officials critical of 
the state’s repressive policies were either fired or sent to the western part of 
Turkey.7 Starting with the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, and especially after 
the 1934 Settlement Act, Law Number 2510, Kurdish elites and tens of thou-
sands of ordinary Kurds were forcibly displaced and resettled in the West-
ern cities of Turkey, while migrants from the Caucasus and other regions 
replaced them in selected provinces.8 This resettlement policy was phased 
out after 1950, but its backbone, the rejection of Kurds and their language, 
remained in effect until the 1990s.
The official discourse and popularized public perception in Turkey were 
that Kurds are not a distinct ethnic group; these Easterners (Doğulular) are 
“mountain Turks,” who had lost the linguistic and cultural similarity with the 
rest of the population, and they needed the modernizing hand of the state. The 
state’s modernization polices aimed to re-acculturate this population so that 
it could catch up with the western cities of the country, and the country as a 
whole could in turn catch up with the civilized western world.9 The inferiority 
complex toward the West is matched by a superiority complex toward Kurds, 
along with the right to control and assimilate this less-developed people 
into Turkish society and culture. In this framework, the conflict becomes a 
struggle between a modernized state and the culturally backward periphery. 
Intellectuals, academics, and political elites can thus easily justify downplay-
ing Kurds and assimilationist policies, preferring to focus on the political 
cleavage, the split between secularism and religion, and the debate between 
socialism and capitalism/imperialism. With the exception of some socialist 
movements that incorporated the Kurds into their discourse of class struggle 
and anti-imperialism, most parties, movements, and major political figures 
were silent about the Turkish state’s denial of an ethnic group’s existence and 
the ban on Kurdish language, music, and culture.
In an attempt to refute the accusation that the state’s policies were assimila-
tionist, Heper (2007) claimed that the Turkish state neither denied nor assimi-
lated Kurds, only mistreating them in times of exceptional “trouble.”10 Under 
normal circumstances, according to the official line as defended by Heper, 
state policies were geared toward re-acculturating Kurds into Turkish society. 
In that way, both Kurds and Kurdified Turks could be reconciled to the rest 
of Turkish society, thereby preserving the integrity and unitary nature of the 
state. Heper conveniently overlooks practices like “skull measuring anthro-
pological attempts to identity ‘real Turks’” and the creation of a new Turkish 
history and theory of language centered around ethnic Turks.11 Nor does he 
discuss the thousands of people who died in the name of re-acculturation or 
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the inequality and discrimination in public employment and the social sphere. 
He asserted that such policies were products of times of particular “trouble,” 
and assumed that the state was otherwise impartial. To the contrary to Heper 
(2007)’s claim, as Tezcür and Gürses (2017) empirically show, these dis-
criminatory policies have not gone away in recent decades, but rather have 
continued to imprint interethnic inequality in the country’s political system.12
The denial of Kurds persisted long after the suppression of the last major 
rebellions against the state in the late 1930s. As Turkey developed a multi-
party political system, Kurdish elites found themselves forced to navigate 
conventional party politics, running as candidates for mayors or parliaments 
in the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP), Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, 
AP), New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi, YTP), center-left Republican 
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), socialist Workers’ Party 
of Turkey (TIP), and Güven Party, as well as independent candidates in 
the 1950s and 1960s. The relatively free atmosphere of the 1960s provided 
opportunities for Kurdish nationalists to form their own left-leaning organiza-
tions and demand solutions to the socioeconomic problems of the East and 
the discriminatory policies of the state. Disinterested Turkish leftist groups 
and organizations viewed the Kurdish problem as a by-product of class con-
flict and imperialism, gradually alienating Kurdish activists and leading them 
to form their own Kurdish organizations (e.g., Eastern Meetings) starting 
with the late 1960s.13
The repressive political atmosphere of the 1970s led some socialist move-
ments that included Kurdish youth and students to believe that taking arms 
against this authoritarian state was the only option, while others remained 
committed to working inside the system to transform it. Beginning in 1978, 
martial law was declared in several Kurdish provinces, and in that same year, 
Turkey’s rejectionist and assimilationist policies sparked the formal estab-
lishment of the PKK, a Marxist/Leninist group of Kurdish students active in 
the leftist and Kurdish student movements, headed by Abdullah Öcalan.14 As 
most of the Kurdish political movements came to existence throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, the PKK built its resistance on anti-colonialism, and the 
ultimate objective of the movement was to form a single (united) independent 
state called “Kurdistan.”15 A secondary objective was a “reunification” or 
“reestablishment” of the left.16 Although the PKK engaged in armed struggles 
against Turkish security forces and prostate Kurdish landlords, its future was 
not certain as it initially had little popular support among Kurds in the region. 
As Bozarslan (2001) argued, however, the military coup of 1980 facilitated 
the popular acceptance of the PKK’s political discourse after the new gov-
ernment banned Kurdish language and music in public spaces, changed the 
Kurdish names of villages and towns, and implemented other repressive 
policies, especially against Kurdish political elites.17 The PKK’s first major 
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deadly attack came only months after the military transferred power to civil-
ians on August 15, 1984, and Kurds, especially those in southeastern Turkey, 
saw the strikes against the security forces as a legitimate response to the 
state’s repressive and assimilationist attitudes toward them.18
RECOGNITION WITH A STICK
The denial policy finally ended in 1991 when the government sent the bill 
to remove the ban speaking “languages other than Turkish.” The change in 
the denial policy was the result of the intense fight between the PKK and the 
security apparatus and the then-president Turgut Özal’s realization that this 
problem could not be solved only through the military means. The PKK had 
posed itself as a formidable actor against exploitative landlords and the mili-
tary over time, proving itself as an effective movement from the relatively 
easily crushed Kurdish rebellion in the 1920s and 1930s. Özal and some civil-
ian elites were aware of a growing threat to the integrity and economic devel-
opment of the state. For example, a former state minister, Adnan Kahveci had 
presented a secret report to Özal that it was the Kurdish issue, rather than any 
economic or other political issue, that posed the greatest problem for the state. 
Suleyman Demirel, the then prime minister, spelled the possibility of a con-
stitutional citizenship in 1992, and Tansu Çiller, replacing Demirel as prime 
minister in 1993, briefly suggested the Basque model as a possible solution.19 
Özal contemplated different ideas to end the conflict, including an amnesty 
to the PKK. However, these ideas were rebuffed by the Kemalist military and 
bureaucracy, the guardians of the traditional Kemalist regime. Rejecting any 
sort of accommodation or compromise paved the way for the return of the 
securitization policies that emphasized a military means to ending the PKK 
and the Kurdish problem as a whole. The hope of finding a peaceful solution 
finally ended with the death of Özal in 1993. While recognizing “the Kurd-
ish reality” and Kurdish identity in 1991, the Turkish state had moved from 
the denial to recognition with a stick, and Kurdish problem is now defined as 
“separatism/terrorism.”
The political discourse of social, political, and economic elites as well as 
the Turkish public followed the footsteps of the Turkish military and state 
institutions over time. In this telling, the Kurdish conflict does not emanate 
from the denial policies that condoned and even justified repression and 
human rights violation, but rather from violence/terrorism, supported by 
foreign powers that have sought Turkey’s division since the Sevres Treaty 
of 1920. Stated simply for the public’s benefit, the state is again under siege 
by imperialist powers, and the PKK is a terrorist organization used by those 
powers to recruit and brainwash the poor and ignorant or to kidnap children 
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from their families. As a transitional public discourse from the denial to the 
unwilling recognition is the claim that the PKK has nothing to do with the 
Kurds; that in reality, its leader Abdullah Öcalan is of Armenian (read: evils) 
origins, as are most of his militants.20
This narrative regarding the PKK was gradually replaced by various 
combinations of discourses of terror, foreign powers, and underdevelop-
ment in subsequent years: Kurds or Easterners are poor and ignorant, easily 
deceivable by the “terrorist” organizations and foreign powers.21 Mainstream 
Turkish media, pro-government or not, have popularized the state narrative 
and worked to discredit the Kurdish political movement. Prior to the 1990s, 
newspapers rarely used phrases like “Kurds” or “Kurdish” in news reports 
or columns. In the 1990s, newspapers began using those terms, implicitly 
acknowledging the reality of the Kurdish situation and a Kurdish ethnicity 
while still aligning with the state discourse. For example, although the media 
began discussing the Kurdish language, they did so in a pejorative sense that 
portrayed it as a primitive language cobbled together from Arabic, Persian, 
and Turkish. The papers in question even cited public opinion surveys as evi-
dence that Kurds were primarily concerned about employment opportunities 
and were relatively unconcerned about learning or speaking Kurdish.22 The 
condescending attitude toward Kurdish becomes evident when the newspa-
pers used terms like “so-called Kurds” or claimed that Kurdish language was 
too primitive to permit sophisticated forms of literature, culture, or politics.
As the government, military, and media promoted the official position, 
neither the left-wing nor right-wing parties provided a substantive challenge 
to the accepted narrative, with some limited exceptions. The Kemalist left 
and its parties, Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkcı Parti, 
SHP/CHP, did not offer policies or solutions to the Kurdish conflict that 
differed from the state’s. For them, the problem was socioeconomic; there-
fore, the solutions remained limited to the eradication of poverty, ignorance, 
underdevelopment, feudalism and so on.23 Neither the center-right AP, nor its 
successor parties went beyond these explanations. When the SHP formed a 
coalition with the Kurdish party, the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik 
Toplum Partisi, DTP), Çiller’s the Basque model proposal for the Kurdish 
problem, or Mesut Yılmaz, former leader of Motherland party after Özal, 
suggested recognizing Kurdish as an official language and offering optional 
language courses and private Kurdish channels, but they were all quickly 
rebuked by the military.24 Nevertheless, these attempts signaled changes in 
the state’s policies in the post-1999 era, when the capture of Öcalan and the 
European Union (EU) negotiations paved the way for new policies amidst the 
economic crisis.25
As for the socialist movements, their relationship with the Kurdish move-
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solutions under the socialist system that they would eventually establish. Like 
proponents of the idea that “Islam is the solution,” the socialist groups kept the 
pillar of their faith and asserted that “socialism is the solution” and that social 
class as an identity supersedes all others, including ethnicity, in the struggle 
against the bourgeoisie/imperialism. Dissatisfied with the socialist movements, 
Kurdish elites gradually divorced from them beginning in the late 1960s.
The Turkish left’s position on the Kurdish conflict should be explored both 
in international and domestic contexts. The left in Turkey has always been 
deeply fragmented, not unlike leftist movements elsewhere, such as France. 
Global contexts (e.g., student movements in the West, the growth of U.S. 
power) as well as local (the 1960 coup and the relatively liberal 1961 Con-
stitution) paved the way for various leftist movements to appear in Turkey. 
Almost all of these movements began with a critique of U.S. imperialism. The 
decade under the governance of the DP was seen as a rupture from the Kemal-
ist revolutionary resistance against the Western imperialism, and therefore one 
of the most common slogans of the 1970s was “Fully Independent Turkey!” 
However, as Jongerden and Akkaya (2012) claim, the Turkish left was mostly 
silent regarding Turkey’s status as a colonizing country in the Southeast.26
The military coups of both 1971 and 1980 were highly influential in shap-
ing the relationship between Kurds and the mainstream left or social democrat 
parties. After 1971, the CHP had a great opportunity to convert the high dyna-
mism among far-left groups into a large voter base for itself because there 
was a high degree of repression on the leftist revolutionary organizations. To 
use this opportunity, the CHP took some effective steps in 1973 and 1974 
regarding political pluralism, and this gained them many supporters especially 
among Kurds and Alevi citizens. In addition, starting in the mid-1970s, the 
volume of political violence reached such a height that the people on both 
sides, Turks and Kurds, began to fear a possible civil war. Therefore, the CHP 
was seen as the only option to stop the political violence. And as a matter of 
fact, the 1970s were significant because of the electoral success of the CHP 
in Kurdistan, thanks to its advocacy of democracy in Turkey. According to 
Bozarslan (2012), the breaking point was the late 1970s when Mehdi Zana 
and several Kurdish figures were elected mayors in Kurdish majority cities.27
After the military intervention of 1980, all of the preexisting political 
parties were eliminated, and therefore the relationship between the Kurdish 
movement and the mainstream left ended. However, a new social democrat 
party was established in 1985. The SHP can be considered a continuation 
of the Kemalist CHP and yet managed to become the second largest party 
in the Turkish Parliament after the 1987 elections. The electoral success 
included several Kurdish representatives, and it was taken as a sign of greater 
openness to recognizing the claims of Kurdistan. However, this symbiotic 
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in the international Kurdish conference in Paris in 1989, which led to their 
expulsion from the party. Nineteen more deputies resigned from the party in 
protest, and laid the groundwork for the establishment of the People’s Labor 
Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP) in 1990, the first of eight such Kurdish 
parties that have since been banned by the state. The alliance between the 
representative actor of the Kurdish movement (HEP) and the mainstream 
Turkish left (SHP) was given one last shot in the 1991 elections, after which 
twenty-two deputies from HEP were returned to parliament. However, the 
controversy regarding the swearing-in ceremony of Hatip Dicle and Leyla 
Zana ended with the revocation of their parliamentary immunity and jail sen-
tences in 1994 for their alleged membership in the PKK.28
Even though the SHP agreed to make room for Kurdish representation, 
there was no further advocacy of pro-Kurdish ideas within the party accord-
ing to Bozarslan (2012).29 Also, there was no explicit mention of Kurds or 
Kurdistan. The party platform’s reference to “Turkey-wide democratization” 
was carefully formulated; in addition, the removal of Kurdish deputies from 
SHP following the Kurdish conference in Paris was critical because it meant 
that Kurds could not integrate into the Turkish political elite class, leaving 
them only the option of becoming autonomous of Turkish political class.30
Yeğen (2007) divides the relationship between the Turkish left and Kurd-
ish movement into four periods between the early republican era and the 
1990s.31 While he describes the 1970s as the period of “decay,” the 1990s are 
the years of “rupture” between the Kurdish movement and the Turkish left. 
For instance, one of the most prominent leftist parties of the 1990s, the Party 
of Freedom and Solidarity (Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi, ÖDP), spoke 
about the need to solve the Kurdish problem but refrained from making it an 
important element of the party’s platform.32 Leaving the task to Kurdish par-
ties would eventually distance the party from Kurds and Kurds from leftist 
Turks. Two other important parties representing the Turkish left in the 1990s, 
the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) and the Labor Party (IP), failed even 
more thoroughly to recognize the autonomous position of the Kurdish move-
ment. For instance, for the TKP the Kurdish issue is simply an example of a 
labor issue. This position is what Yeğen (2007) describes as dating “back to 
the beginning of the socialist movements in modern Turkey’s history,” which 
means that the party would support the Kurdish movement not in their efforts 
of national and cultural rights and demands, but rather in their class struggle 
against imperialism.33 The IP, under the leadership of Doğu Perinçek, com-
pletely changed its position toward the Kurdish movement, and in 2005, the 
party declared that the Kurdish issue had been solved regarding democratic 
rights that Kurds had been demanding.34 In the following years, the party 
leadership went even further and adopted a racist and hostile discourse 
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On the other hand, the (Turkish) Islamist movements, including the Wel-
fare Party (WP) and their successors have long been attributing the Kurdish 
problem to secularism and the Kemalist ideology, believing that the secular-
ist policies of “the past” had weakened the religious ties between Turks and 
Kurds. They courted Kurds with a less nationalistic discourse electoral pro-
gram. One the one hand, they recognized Kurds as a distinct group with its 
language and culture in their programs and discourses, but at the same time 
wanted to subordinate them to a supranational Islamic identity.35 By capturing 
the state they tried to Islamize the society but failed to offer any substantive 
changes to existing political institutions, which were the products of hard-
core nation-state ideology. As a result, they neither wanted nor needed to 
craft a meaningful proposal or policy to deal with the Kurdish question.
Ümit Cizre’s work on the Islamist actors in the Kurdish conflict shows how 
the Islamists portrayed the conflict to their bases in the 1990s. The Turkish-
Islamists emphasized the distinctiveness of Kurds. They often highlighted 
human rights violations in the region, but were careful not to offend the 
sensibilities of the Kemalist state, emphasizing the integrity of the Turkish 
state under one flag and motherland.36 The Kurdish Islamists have sought a 
solution to the problem from claims of Islamic brotherhood and the formula 
of “Ummah,” but noticed that Turkish Islamists do not share the practical 
implications of being part of it, noting such glaring absences as constitutional 
recognition of Kurds or the provision of Kurdish education. The first shock 
to Kurdish Islamists came with the 1991 electoral coalition of the Welfare 
Party (WP) with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which 
wields significant power and influence among the state’s security apparatus. 
This coalition showed the “nationalist reflex” of the Islamist WP, thereby 
increasing skepticism toward Turkish Islamist parties among Kurds. The 
party’s nationalistic discourse and practices belied their (disingenuous) usage 
of Islamic brotherhood, resonated less among Kurds, and reduced the total 
votes for the WP and its successor parties in the region in the subsequent 
elections even though its national vote increased. However, the post Febru-
ary 28 developments in which the WP-led government was overthrown; the 
Constitution Court banned the WP, and successor Virtue Party helped Kurds 
to maintain the benefit of the doubt toward the (Turkish) Islamic movement 
and its parties.
AKP ERA: HOPE AND HOPELESSNESS
The AKP era initially seemed to deserve the benefit of the doubt from 
Kurds. The AKP leadership’s statements did not differ significantly from its 
predecessor, the WP: They blamed the Kurdish problem on the repression 
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and mistakes of the past secularist regime. The capture of Öcalan, the EU 
Accession process, along with the abolishment of the death penalty and other 
changes paved the way for the AKP to launch some reforms. This era has 
also been an opportunity, especially for religious Kurds, to test the AKP’s 
discourse of “Islamic brotherhood” between Turks and Kurds. Erdogan’s 
message gave hope to Kurds, as he stated the Kurdish conflict was not the 
cause but the consequences of the repressive policies of single-party era. To 
the chagrin of the Kemalist establishment in the state apparatus, the AKP 
governments have passed several reform bills in the parliament, but the 
implementation of many programs was purposefully delayed or stagnated by 
an unwilling security and bureaucratic state apparatus. Nevertheless, assisted 
also by the bill passed several months before it came to power in 2002, the 
AKP governments restored Kurdish names to Kurdish villages, private bodies 
were allowed to teach Kurdish, broadcasting Kurdish in public and private 
channels was permitted, as was the repatriation of some “internally displaced 
Kurds to their original homes.”37
The AKP leader, Erdogan, saw secularism as a cause of division between 
Turks and Kurds and “highlighted the value of unification and brotherhood 
on the basis of ‘common citizenship’ in the Republic of Turkey.”38 Erdogan 
played with the idea of Türkiyelilik, that is to say, belonging to the citizenship 
of Turkey in the early years of the AKP rule, but his references have become 
sporadic over time. Given the fact that neither CHP nor any other major 
political actor offered anything beyond the AKP’s policy initiatives, there 
was cautious optimism among supporters of the Kurdish political movement 
that the AKP as an antiestablishment party was the one that could solve the 
Kurdish problem despite its leaders’ contradictory or ambivalent statements. 
The military suzerainty over the political sphere, the party closures, the Inter-
net memorandum (e-muhtıra) of April 27, 2007 by the military—despite the 
changing rhetoric of Erdogan regarding the Kurdish conflict—appealed to 
Kurds. This helped the AKP win the majority of Kurdish votes in Kurdish-
majority cities, even increasing its share of the vote in Diyarbakır from 16 
percent in 2002 elections to 41 percent in 2007.
For the Kurdish political movement, despite some “positive” steps and dis-
course from the AKP, as a result of the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) 
operations that started in April 2009, more than 8,000 people were impris-
oned, signaling the return to securitization policies of the Kurdish conflict.39 
For the Kurdish movement, and later for Kurds outside of the movement, 
“the distinction between the ‘Kemalist state’ and the ‘AKP government’” has 
become hazy, even for secular pro-Kurdish movements which had previously 
sympathized with the AKP. Furthermore, the AKP’s cyclic arrogance toward 
the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, its harsh response to Kurdish 
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the creation of a de facto Kurdish autonomy in Syria have revealed to tradi-
tionally religious Kurds just how limited its discourse on Islamic brotherhood 
really is.
When it comes to the recognition of collective rights, such as having Kurd-
ish education in public and private schools or the acceptance of Kurds in 
the Constitution as a separate ethnic group, Erdogan was discreet or quietly 
unwilling while the Kemalist vanguard organization, the military, was not. 
As a reaction to the EU Commission president who urged Turkey to reform 
cultural and political rights for Kurds, in 2008, the then chief of staff, İlker 
Başbuğ, said the following: “Nobody can demand or expect Turkey to make 
collective arrangements for a certain ethnic group in the political arena, out-
side of the cultural arena, that would endanger the nation-state structure as 
well as the unitary state structure.”40
While this skepticism was increasing within the Kurdish political move-
ment, there were still secret negotiations between the AKP governments and 
the Kurdish movement. News of the Oslo Process, which consisted of secret 
talks between the PKK and state officials, was leaked by the security appara-
tus associated with the Gülenist movement that wanted to resolve the Kurdish 
problem through their own form of Islamic brotherhood. For this purpose, the 
Gülenist movement actively engaged in opening schools, university preps 
institutions, and houses for young Kurds.41 As they competed for Kurdish 
membership, they not only received support from their members, but also 
from nonmembers who saw them as a lesser evil than the PKK. The state has 
also collaborated with major business organizations such as Turkish Industry 
and Business Association (TÜSIAD) and the Union of Chambers and Com-
modity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), as well as local and national NGOs, to 
assert its assimilationist policies toward Kurds. These organizations actively 
drafted programs or participated in “no child behind” policies, “required pre-
school initiatives” in order to “enable children in whose houses the spoken 
language is Kurdish to speak Turkish well.”42
What about the Kurdish movement and the trajectory of their policies 
toward the conflict? According to Güneş (2013), the PKK began its attempts 
to adopt a political solution to the conflict in the 1990s, especially follow-
ing Öcalan’s trial when the organization began to frame the solution to the 
Kurdish question “on the basis of development and deepening of democracy 
and the creation of decentralized and democratized political entities.”43 The 
significant shift regarding the demands and goals of the PKK, from regional 
autonomy or federalism toward democratic autonomy, was justified by the 
fact that the Kurdish population in Turkey was geographically dispersed. In 
2005, the PKK announced that the original objective of forming a Kurdish 
nation-state had become an impediment on the route to freedom and the new 
strategic goal was the establishment of “an interlinked network of councils 
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as the basis of self-determination and a means of living together.”44 This 
change in discourse does not mean that the PKK gave up on its claims to 
self-determination; rather, it had developed a new understanding of a radical 
democracy that will become possible only through the active involvement 
of citizens.
The Kurdish movement also used religious discourse both to attract reli-
gious Kurds and to serve as a counter-move to the religious rhetoric of the 
AKP. To counter both the government and Islamic movements, the predomi-
nantly secular elites of the Kurdish political movement continually softened 
its secularist stance. This strategic change can also be found in its leaders’ 
writings. While Öcalan considered Islam reactionary and backward in the 
1980s, his later writings assigned it a positive role to Islam, in particular, the 
revolutionary character of Prophet against established order. Sarıgil (2018) 
describes how in March of 2011 pro-PKK clerics refused to participate in Fri-
day prayers in Turkish, and instead began offering public prayers in Kurdish 
as a counterweight to the state-controlled mosques.45 The Democratic Islam 
Congress and other affiliated religious bodies have also pursued policies to 
appeal to religious Kurds. Several prominent political Islamists were also 
nominated as members of Parliament (MPs), such as Şerafettin Elçi and Altan 
Tan, and others were chosen as electoral candidates to become either mayor 
or MPs of pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in the elections 
of 2011 and on.
Through negotiating with the Kurdish movement both openly and secretly, 
the AKP resorted to the policies aimed to increase religiosity in the region. 
Religious schools (Imam Hatips) and mosques have disproportionately 
mushroomed in the region under the AKP when compared to the rest of the 
country.46 The directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and their salaried 
imams and the employment of “meles,” who are the graduates of informal 
religious schools (madrasas) in the region, have been mobilized with the goal 
of reducing the influence of the Kurdish movement. Also, the AKP govern-
ments have pursued the policies to strengthen rival Kurdish movements in 
the region. These religious movements ranged from the Gülenist movement 
to the various factions of Nur and Nakshibendi movements to the Islamist 
Huda-Par and its predecessors. At the same time, these movements, through 
normative and resource ties to the governments, expanded their sphere of 
influences, increasing their activities and associations as well as through 
media and radio. They have been a major rival to the Kurdish movement in its 
efforts to increase its sphere of influence to the rest of Kurds in the region.47
After continuous disappointments with the government reform promises, 
the Islamic movements’ approach and solutions have started to converge 
with the Kurdish movement. While still seeing the Kurdish movement a 
rival anti-religious movement, religious Kurdish movements have had to 
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adapt their discourse in order to compete effectively in Kurdish cities.48 
Over time, these movements have also increased their demand for the right 
to have education in mother tongue, Friday sermons (hutbe) in Kurdish, 
and Kurdish names for villages and towns. Besides, observing the growing 
nationalist discourse of Turkish Islamists and their disinterest in the Kurd-
ish problem has further reduced the credibility of the solutions based on 
“Islamic brotherhood.” In contrast, as the findings below suggest, secular 
and non-secular Kurds have started to converge regarding their linguistic 
and cultural demands.
In sum, as the AKP was associated with the state, not a party that chal-
lenges the Kemalist state, its solutions became very similar to those of the 
Kemalists, with some minor improvements. The AKP has viewed “the PKK 
and underdevelopment as the diagnostic,” to solve the conflict it relies on 
the socioeconomic development policies as well as bestowing some cultural 
rights as individual rights. It offered to teach Kurdish as an optional course, 
but not as a collective right that guaranteed an education in the Kurdish lan-
guage, or that established Kurdish schools.49
THE KURDISH STREET AND CULTURAL 
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
During the peace talks, the AKP governments reached the limit of its will-
ingness to compromise by offering to recognize the “folkloric identity” 
of Kurds, that is to say, permitting optional Kurdish language, allowing 
defendants speaking Kurdish to use translators (but paid by themselves) 
in courts, opening Kurdish language departments in selected universities, 
Kurdish TV channels, and so on.50 Erdogan was using ambiguous language, 
regarding education in Kurdish, to court Kurds and not to increase resent-
ment among Kurds until around the peace process was failing in 2015.51 
Erdogan’s press talk, soon after he repudiated the Dolmabahçe talks is 
revealing. Erdogan disclosed his opinions on “solving the Kurdish prob-
lem” when asked about education in Kurdish: “Did we put optional courses 
in mother language within our education system? Done. What else do you 
want? Do you suggest that it be required? How come something like this 
happens? This country has one official language. (If you give this up), you 
cannot stop other demands.”52
In contrast, the Kurdish movement has demanded the recognition of Kurds 
in the Constitution, education in the Kurdish language, Kurdish names for 
places, religious sermons in Kurdish, recognition of Kurdish as an official 
language, a Kurdish parliament, and so on. Islamist Kurdish movements also 
share similar positions on linguistic and cultural demands but differ in their 
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political ones such as regional parliament, flag, and autonomy and secession. 
While Turkish governments keep defining the PKK as a terrorist organization 
even while negotiating in secrecy and the HDP as an organic extension of 
PKK, the Kurdish public views them differently, as the election results and 
public opinion surveys show.
Is there a convergence between Kurdish public opinion and political actors 
concerning the issues discussed above? To determine this, we utilized two 
nation-wide representative surveys conducted in 2011 and 2015.53 The survey 
was conducted in Turkish and Kurdish (the latter in the Kurdish-populated 
residential areas). Using a multistage, stratified, clustered random sampling, 
these surveys reached approximately 6,900 and 7,100 adult participants 
across Turkey in 2011 and 2015, respectively. Fourteen percent of the respon-
dents in 2011 (901 persons) and 17 percent in 2015 (1,340 persons) identi-
fied themselves as Kurdish. The responses display the preference of only the 
Kurdish respondents in this study.
To capture public opinion among Kurds, we first turn to table 2.1 to pres-
ent the results of the public opinion survey about the extent to which Kurds 
feel that they are equal citizens of the Turkish state. Table 2.1 suggests that 
47 percent of Kurds in 2011 believe that the state discriminates against 
Kurds. This rate rose to 57 percent in 2015. When the respondents were 
asked whether civil rights and liberties in Turkey reflect equality between 
Turks and Kurds, 65 percent of Kurds said no. The same percentage of Kurds 
perceived interethnic socioeconomic inequality. When we imperfectly com-
pare these results with Ergil’s findings, which are based on a public opinion 
survey conducted in August 2008 in cities where Kurds make up a significant 
percentage of the population, we see that the perception of discriminatory 
behavior was also high.54 When people were asked in his survey whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the statement that Kurds experience discrimination 
in western cities, this perception of discrimination reached 51.2 percent in the 
then DTP-dominated cities and 29 percent in the regional cities where DTP is 
not dominant. Imperfect comparison of Ergil’s findings with this study, as the 
sampling methodology and differences in the wordings of the survey ques-
tions, suggests that the perception of discrimination and interethnic inequality 
has remained high among Kurds.
When the second survey was conducted in April 2015, the future of the 
peace talks looked bleak, yet it was before the urban warfare started in 
Diyarbakır’s historic Sur region and other Kurdish cities, and the Kurdish 
opening officially ended in August 2015. Between 2013, when the peace was 
officially celebrated and 2015, when the second survey was conducted, the 
PKK and the HDP had both increased their popular support among Kurds. The 
Roboski massacre and the Kobani siege had resulted in great disappointment 
in the AKP, which was perceived as condoning of the killings of Kurds by the 
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Turkish military and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) respectively. 
The AKP’s policies and the political mobilization of the Kurdish movement 
for the defense of Kobani siege also created sympathy toward the Kurdish 
movement among the Kurds who had distanced themselves from the PKK. In 
addition to the Roboski massacre and Kobani, one can argue that peace talks 
legitimized the PKK in the eyes of skeptical and pragmatic Kurds that do not 
want to be alienated from the Kurdish political movement for potential politi-
cal and economic benefits in the aftermath of possible peace process and new 
political configurations. If the state recognized the PKK, then people hailed 
the PKK and the Kurdish movement as a powerful political organization of 
the future. The increasing legitimation of the PKK has become obvious in 
respondents’ answers to three questions. Table 2.2 shows that 30 percent in 
2011, and 55 percent in 2015 stated that the PKK represents Kurds. Those 
who did not recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization increased from 48 
percent to 55 percent in 2015. Given the possibility that some Kurds may 
view the PKK not a terrorist organization, but do not see it as an organization 
representing Kurds, we operationalize another variable: popular support for 
Table 2.1  Perception of Interethnic Political and Economic Inequality
 2011 (%) 2015 (%)
State discrimination against Kurds 47 57
Inequality in civil rights and liberties – 65
Inter-ethnic socioeconomic inequality – 65
N 901 1340
Note: The translations of the questions are as follows: Do you think that Kurds face discrimination from 
the state? Do you think that Kurds and Kurds have the same civil rights and liberties?; Do you think that 
there is socioeconomic equality between Turks and Kurds? The answers were either yes or no; and some 
answers were recoded while making this table.
Source: The authors created this table using statistics from two original public opinion surveys conducted 












Table 2.2 Kurdish Street and PKK
 2011 (%) 2015 (%)
PKK represents Kurds 30 55
PKK is not a terror organization 48 55
PKK as a legal political party 63* 85/57*
N 901 1340
*Note: The translations of the questions are as follows: Do you think that the PKK represent Kurds; is the PKK 
a terrorist organization? The question for the PKK as a legal party was asked differently in these surveys. 
The 2011 survey asks “PKK should disarm itself and participate in politics” while the 2015 survey divides 
the question of the earlier survey and asks as two separate questions: (1) Should PKK disarm itself and end 
the armed struggle? (2) Should PKK form a political party and participate in politics?
Source: The authors created this table using statistics from two original public opinion surveys conducted 
in 2011 and 2015.
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the PKK. The popular support, that is to say, those who do not view the PKK 
as a terrorist organization and at the same time view it as an organization 
that represents Kurds, has increased from 27 percent in 2011 to 45 percent in 
2015. Ergil (2010) had found that the percentage of those who do not view the 
PKK as a terrorist organization was 29 percent in DTP dominant cities and 16 
percent in other cities in the region.55 However, the high percentage of “I do 
not know,” 24 percent in the first group of cities and 16 percent in the second 
group suggest that the actual support may be higher.56
Figure 2.1 displays the results of the BDP in 2011 and HDP in 2015. The 
percentage of people who believed that Kurdish parties represent Kurds 
increased from 55 to 64. Those who answered negatively to this question 
declined from 22 to 15 percent in 2015. Taking into account those who view 
the PKK only partially favorably, the results suggest that both before but 
more significantly after the peace talks, the Kurdish political movement had 
reached a high degree of support, more than 64 percent.
Figure 2.2 suggests that the linguistic and cultural demands of Kurds 
from the state is at a level higher than the Turkish state imagines or is will-
ing to grant. Even before the peace talks, Kurds wanted Friday sermons in 
Kurdish (70%), education in in their mother tongue (65%), optional Kurdish 
courses (80%), Kurdish names for villages (80%), towns, and other localities 
(74%), as well as wanting to be served in Kurdish in state institutions such as 
municipalities, courts, and hospitals (82%). The support for these linguistic 
Figure 2.1  Do Kurdish Parties Represent Kurds? (%) Note: The translations of the ques-
tions are as follows: Do you think that the successor party of HADEP and DEHAP, the 
BDP is a party that represents Kurds? (2011); and do you think that the successor party of 
HADEP, DEHAP and BDP, the HDP, having seats in Parliament, is a party that represent 
Kurds? (2015). Source: The authors created this figure using statistics from two original 
public opinion surveys conducted in 2011 and 2015.
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rights has reached 87 percent and more, except for education in their mother 
language (83%). Ergil (2010) asks a similar question, whether one supports 
education in Kurdish.57 Fifty-nine percent of Kurds in DTP-dominant cities 
and towns said yes, but this percentage went down to 16 percent in regional 
cities where DTP was not the dominant party. However, the high percentage 
of “I do not knows” in the first (14%) and especially in the second category 
(38%) does not allow us to make a meaningful comparison, but due to the 
reasons discussed in footnote 6, the results suggest that support for cultural 
rights have been high among Kurds.
Do these results translate into supporting political autonomy or even seces-
sion? Figure 2.3 suggests that more than half of Kurds would like to entertain 
their linguistic and cultural rights with political autonomy as citizens of the 
Turkish state. The peace talks increased their demand for regional parlia-
ments (49 to 64%), a regional flag (40 to 58%), and Kurdish as an official 
language (56 to 74%) as the survey year moves from 2011 to 2015. Having 
said that, the support for an independent Kurdish state increased significantly, 
Figure 2.2 Support for Linguistic/Cultural Rights (%) Note: The translations of the 
questions are as follows: Do you think that municipalities, hospitals, and courts provide 
services in Kurdish? Kurdish names for locations such as villages, towns, and cities would 
be allowed; education in mother tongue in primary/secondary and high schools should 
be allowed if there is a demand? Do you think that optional courses in Kurdish should 
be offered like English and German? Friday sermon in Kurdish should be provided in the 
Kurdish-dominant places? Source: The authors created this figure using statistics from two 
original public opinion surveys conducted in 2011 and 2015.
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but remained at less than half of the population, rising from 24 percent in 
2011 to 38 percent in 2015.
CONCLUSION
We discussed the changing policies and positions of political parties and 
Kurdish political actors over time and claimed that the lengthy civil war has 
created a convergence of demands between secular and religious Kurds, in 
particular linguistic and cultural rights. The findings on the public opinion 
survey conducted in 2015 suggest that more than 80 percent of the Kurdish 
public has demanded the right to study their language, receive an education 
in their mother language, get served in public institutions in Kurdish, and 
want to listen to Friday sermons in Kurdish. These figures imply, without the 
fulfillment of them that neither the Kurdish conflict nor the political instabil-
ity fed by it will end.58
Furthermore, the Kurdish public opinion wants “an official recogni-
tion” without a stick. Despite some reforms, the Turkish state under the 
Figure 2.3  Support for Political Rights: Autonomy, Independence and others (%) Note: 
The translations of the questions are as follows: Do you think that Kurds should secede 
from Turkey and form an independent state? Do you think the Kurdish language, in addi-
tion to Turkish, should be recognized as an official language? Do you think that there 
should be a regional flag in the Kurdish-dominant places? Should there be a regional 
parliament in the Kurdish-dominant places? Do you think that Kurds should have auton-
omy in Turkey? The respondents answered this question, Yes or No. Source: The authors 
created this figure using statistics from two original public opinion surveys conducted in 
2011 and 2015.
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conservative AKP governments still refuses official recognition of Kurds 
and the Kurdish language. The “too little too late” policy of the Turkish state 
toward the Kurdish conflict created not only distrust between Kurds and 
the Turkish state, but also fostered cultural nationalism, a prerequisite for 
political demands.59 Now, Kurds want their language to be an official state 
language and they aspire to have their regional government, parliament, and 
flag within the existing borders. While the majority agrees upon autonomy 
of these regional institutions, only a little more than one-third of the Kurds 
seek secession. However, the maltreatment of the Kurds and the continuation 
of the rejection of linguistic and cultural rights may help the upward trend in 
demanding an independent state, fostering inter-ethnic communal violence 
and social unrest.60 In this sense, the findings confirm that the securitization 
of the Kurdish conflict has transformed Kurds with a private ethnic identity 
or non-politicized disposition into politicized ones; this is especially true of 
Kurdish youths who associate the Turkish state with the military and police, 
and their hostile attitudes and behaviors toward them.61
Turning to Kurdish actors, the higher support for legal politics through the 
Democratic Regions Party (DBP) and HDP, rather than support for the PKK, 
suggests that the Kurdish public opinion lends its support for these parties. 
Kurds have already endured decades of “Emergency Rule” (OHAL), curfew, 
extrajudicial killings, and human rights abuses amidst economic and social 
difficulties. High support for legal Kurdish parties suggests that seeking an 
“ordinary life” and “ordinary politics” is among their primary preferences. 
The urban warfare in the post-2015 era and the displacement of hundreds 
of thousands of people as a result may exert an effect on attitudes toward 
Kurdish parties and the PKK that should be examined in future studies. One 
can assume that while the PKK lost some support among Kurds, this does 
not mean that it was replaced by support for the AKP or the state actors, 
especially as long as Kurds do not see any improvement in their political 
rights and economic situation. Now, the AKP has been transformed from 
anti-establishment party to the statist party in the eyes of the Kurdish public 
as a result of increasing terror discourse toward the Kurdish conflict by the 
AKP government in alliance with the ultranationalist MHP). This percep-
tion has been consolidated by the replacement of elected mayors by the 
state-appointed ones (kayyum/kayyım) between 2016 and the 2019 March 
local elections and the ongoing imprisonment of Kurdish MPs, including 
the party cochairs, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ. There is 
increasing evidence that there is high support for the securitization of Kurd-
ish rights among the Turkish state apparatus and the Turkish public. This 
trend, merged with the state’s concerns due to the Kurdish enclave in Syria 
and unforeseen events in the region, is likely to prolong the political status 
quo and civil war at the cost of significant loss of life, as well as civil and 
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political liberties.62 Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how long this unof-
ficial recognition with a stick policy toward Kurds will continue without 
a reformed political system that is responsive to the cultural and political 
demands of Kurds.
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